Entity authentication and key distribution are central cryptographic problems in distributed computing|but up until now, they have lacked even a meaningful de nition. One consequence is that incorrect and ine cient protocols have proliferated. This paper provides the rst treatment of these problems in the complexity-theoretic framework of modern cryptography. Addressed in detail are two problems of the symmetric, two-party setting: mutual authentication and authenticated key exchange. For each w e present a de nition, protocol, and proof that the protocol meets its goal, assuming the minimal assumption of pseudorandom function. When this assumption is appropriately instantiated, the protocols given are practical and e cient.
Introduction

Context
For centuries, cryptographic protocols were designed by trial and error. A scheme was proposed, and people tried to break it. If they didn't succeed then, after a while, the scheme was assumed to be adequate. History has shown that the success rate of this method is not too impressive: proposed protocols were often broken, sometimes years after they were rst put forward.
The early 1980s saw the proposal of a fundamental and radical idea to get beyond iterative, attack-responsive design of cryptographic protocols: Goldwasser and Micali 21 , followed by BlumMicali 7 and Yao 39 , suggested that security could be proved under standard" and well-believed complexity theoretic assumptions e.g., the assumed intractability of factoring. The methodology which they identi ed has come to be known as provable security." Achieving it for a given problem of interest entails providing i a de nition of the goal, ii a protocol, and iii a proof that the protocol meets its goal, assuming some standard complexity-theoretic assumption holds true.
By 1985 provable security had been achieved for probabilistic encryption 21 , pseudorandom number generation 7, 39 and digital signatures 23 . It was then the opinion of many researchers that provable security w as in hand for all of the basic" cryptographic primitives. Attention turned to other issues, such as reducing the complexity assumptions needed to achieve provable security or increasing the e ciency of the constructions.
As it happens, the belief that provable security had been achieved for all of cryptography's basic primitives was wrong; there remained a crucial set of unformalized goals which w ere wellknown to applied cryptographers and those who had tried to build secure distributed system. These goals involve entity authentication and associated problems key distribution. We n o w turn towards describing these objectives.
Informal problem statement
Entity authentication is the process by which an agent in a distributed system gains con dence in the identity of a communication partner. More often than not, the entity authentication process is coupled with the distribution of a session key" which the partners can later use for message con dentiality, i n tegrity, or whatever else. These are central problems in computing practice, for without their resolution distributed computing cannot realistically get o the ground. This importance is re ected in the enormous amount of attention that these problems have received in the literature; literally hundreds of papers have been written and protocols proposed and implemented.
Yet entity authentication for the distributed environment rests on no satisfactory formal foundations. This is more than an academic complaint. We are speaking of an area in which an informal approach has often lead to work which i s a t w orst wrong, and at best only partially analyzable. In particular, an alarming fraction of proposed authentication protocols have subsequently been found to be awed. It is therefore desirable that con dence in an authentication protocol should stem from more than a few people's inability to break it. In fact, in the tradition of provable security discussed above, each signi cant e n tity authentication goal should be formally de ned and any candidate protocol should be proven to meet its goal under a standard cryptographic assumption. Of course the de nition must properly model the real-world characteristics of the problem at hand, the protocols must be practical, and the proofs must be meaningful" for practice.
Problems in authentication and authenticated key distribution come in various avors: there may b e t w o parties involved or more; the authentication may be unilateral or mutual; parties might the symmetric case or might not the asymmetric case share a secret key. This paper focuses on two v ersions of the the two-party, m utual, symmetric case. In the mutual authentication problem the parties engage in a conversation in which each gains con dence that it is the other with whom he speaks. In the authenticated key exchange problem the parties also want to distribute a fresh" and secret" session key. 1 Despite their signi cance and long histories, both problems lack a n y modern, complexity-theoretic treatment. In particular, the primitives and tools formalized and understood in the theoretical community t o d a y e.g. encryption, signatures, zeroknowledge 22 , proofs of knowledge, identi cation don't seem adequate to treat these problems.
Provable security for entity authentication
We provide entity authentication and key distribution with provable security, raising these goals to the same level as primitives such as encryption, pseudorandom generators, or digital signatures. In particular, we o er protocols whose security can be guaranteed from weak complexity-theoretic assumptions, bringing assurance to an area which has been fraught with uncertainty.
The de nitional ideas needed to treat these problems are novel. Notions like indistinguishability 21, 22 and simulatability 22 which w ere so successful in formalizing other cryptographic primitives are not enough for this setting. In fact, we h a v e to begin by re-de ning the very model which underlies the communication. Model . It has been pointed out in many places that one di culty i n l a ying foundations for entity authentication has been the lack of an appropriate model for authentication in the distributed environment. We specify an appropriate model. To be fully general here, we assume that all communication among interacting parties is under the adversary's control. In particular, the adversary can read the messages produced by the parties, provide messages of her own to them, modify messages before they reach their destination, and delay messages or replay them. Most importantly, the adversary can start up entirely new instances" of any of the parties, modeling the ability o f communicating agents to simultaneously engage in many sessions at once; this gives us the ability to model the kinds of attacks that were suggested by 6 . Formally, each party will be modeled by an in nite collection of oracles which the adversary may run. These oracles only interact with the adversary, they never directly interact with one another. See Section 3.
Note how this di ers from the models underlying notions such a s i n teractive proofs 22 or secure function evaluation 38, 20 . In the former case the communication is trusted and it is one of the parties who may be adversarial; in the later case, individual parties may be good or bad, but their communication proceeds in a simple and orderly manner. In neither case is there an analogue to the notion of sessions.
Definitions. In the presence of an adversary as powerful as the one we de ne, it is unclear what it could possibly mean to be convinced that one has engaged in a conversation with a speci ed 1 At rst glance it might seem unnecessary for two parties who already share a key a to come up with another key . One reason a new key is useful is the necessity o f a v oiding cross-session replay attacks" |messages copied from one session being deemed authentic in another| coupled with an insistence on not attempting to carry state" information e.g., a message counter across distinct sessions. partner; after all, every bit communicated has really been communicated to the the adversary, instead. We deal with this problem as follows.
As has often been observed, an adversary in our setting can always make the parties accept by faithfully relaying messages among the communication partners. But this behavior does not constitute a damaging attack; indeed, the adversary has functioned just like a wire, and may a s w ell not have been there. The idea of our de nition of a mutual authentication is then simple but strong: we s a y that a protocol is secure if the only way that an adversary can get a party to accept is by faithfully relaying messages in this manner. In other words, any adversary e ectively behaves as a trusted wire, if not a broken one. Formalizing this simple idea is not so simple; the main tool will be a notion of matching conversations.
To de ne authenticated key exchange it is necessary to capture a protocol's robustness against the loss of a session key: even if the adversary gets hold of one, this should not compromise anything but the session which that key protects. We model this requirement b y allowing the adversary to obtain session keys just by asking for them. When this inquiry is made, the key is no longer fresh, and any partner's key is declared unfresh, too. Fresh keys must remain protected." We formalize the adversary's inability to gain any helpful information about them along the lines of formalizations of security for probabilistic encryption 21, 1 6 , 17 .
Protocols. Having de ned mutual authentication and authenticated key exchange, we provide protocols to achieve these ends. Four protocols are speci cally discussed in this paper. Protocol MAP1, which is an extension of the protocol 2PP of 6 , is a mutual authentication protocol for an arbitrary set I of players. Protocol MAP2 is an extension of MAP1, allowing arbitrary text strings to be authenticated along with its ows. Protocol AKEP1 is a simple authenticated key exchange which uses MAP2 to do the key distribution. Protocol AKEP2 is a particularly e cient authenticated key exchange which i n troduces the idea of implicitly" distributing a key; its ows are identical to MAP1, but it accomplishes a key distribution all the same. The primitive required for all of these protocols is a pseudorandom function.
Our protocols are simpler than previous ones. Our ability to attain provable security while simultaneously simplifying the solutions illustrates an advantage of having a clear de nition of what one is trying to achieve; lacking such a de nition, previous solutions encumbered their protocols with unnecessary features.
Proofs. Assuming that pseudorandom functions exist, each protocol that we give i s p r o v en to meet the de nition for the task which this protocol is claimed to carry out. The proofs for MAP1 and AKEP1 are given in this paper; the proofs for MAP2 and AKEP2 are omitted because they are essentially identical.
Design for practice
Provably secure protocols are not usually e cient. Ours are an exception to this rule. Every protocol presented in this paper is e cient in terms of rounds, communication, and computation. This e ciency was designed into our protocols in part through the choice of the underlying primitive| namely, a pseudorandom function.
In theory, pseudorandom functions and other important cryptographic primitives one-way functions, pseudorandom generators, digital signatures are equivalent 26, 2 4 , 1 8 , 33 , since the existence of any one of these implies the existence of the others.
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In practice, pseudorandom functions with the right domain and range are a highly desirable starting point for e cient protocols in the symmetric setting. The reason is that beginning with primitives like DES and MD5 one can construct e cient pseudorandom functions with arbitrary domain and range lengths, and these constructions are themselves provably secure given plausible assumptions about DES and MD5. See Section 6 for discussion of these issues.
Our proofs are not so bad as to render the reductions meaningless for cryptographic practice. In other words, if one had a practical method to defeat the entity authentication, this would translate into a practical method to defeat the underlying pseudorandom function.
History and related work
Unsatisfactory protocols for entity authentication and key distribution have been leading researchers steadily towards establishing rm foundations. An important step in the process was that of Bird, Gopal, Herzberg, Janson, Kutten, Molva and Yung 6 . They drew attention to this area by pointing to new classes of attacks, called interleaving attacks," which they used to break existing protocols, and they suggested a protocol 2PP defeated by none of the interleaving attacks they considered. The recognition of interleaving attacks helped lead us to the formal model of Section 3, and our MAP1 protocol is an extension of 2PP. H o w ever, while an analysis such as theirs is useful as a way to spot errors in a protocol, resistance to interleaving attacks does not make a satisfactory notion of security; in particular, it is easy to construct protocols which are insecure but defeated by n o attack from the enumeration. When our work was announced, the authors of 6 told us that they understood this limitation and had themselves been planning to work on general de nitions; they also told us that the CBC assumption of their paper 6, De nition 2.1 was intended for proving security under a general de nition.
Mentioned in the introduction of 6 is an idea of matching histories." Di e, van Oorschot and Wiener 11 expand on this to introduce a notion of matching protocol runs." They re ne this idea to a level of precision adequate to help them separate out what are and what are not meaningful" attacks on the protocols they consider. Although 11 stops short of providing any formal de nition or proof, the basic notion these authors describe is the same as ours and is the basis of a de nition of entity authentication. Thus there is a clear re nement of de nitional ideas rst from 6 to 11 , and then from 11 to our work. The failure of the informal approach to designing correct authentication protocols has led to widespread recognition of the need for better foundations. By now the continued absence of a formal de nition is a recognized de ciency. See, for example, 11 and 5, p. 59 .
A di erent line of work aimed at improving the design and analysis of entity authentication protocols begins with the paper of Burrows, Abadi and Needham 8 . This logic-based" approach attempts to reason" that an authentication protocol is correct as it evolves the set of beliefs" of its participants. This idea is useful and appealing, but it has a serious defect: a correctness proof does not guarantee that the protocol is right, only that it lacks the aws in reasoning captured by the underlying logic. Thus while a negative result implies that something is wrong, a positive 2 We remark that the existence of a secure mutual authentication protocol implies the existence of a one-way function, as can be shown using techniques of 25 ; thus mutual authentication also exists if and only if one-way functions do. result gives no assurance that everything is all right.
The notion of a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge" 22, 13, 35, 9 , 1 4 , 3 has underlied identi cation protocols in the smart card model. But the de nition of an interactive proof does not attempt to model attacks in which responses of entities are played o against one another, as is required for the distributed setting. Furthermore, unilateral authentication is not proving knowledge" of a secret insofar as it is is fundamentally irrelevant that an agent A knows" a in the sense that it can be extracted by a simulator: all that is important is that the good party can prove his identity and a bad party can't.
More closely related to the approach w e adopt is the idea of a non-transferable proof, a notion for asymmetric, unilateral authentication due to Feige, Fiat and Shamir 13 . Here an honest claimant P interacts with a cheating veri erṼ , and then a Ṽ -conspiring cheating proverP tries to convince an honest veri er V that she P is really P. This appealing de nition models a w orld of smart-card claimants and untrusted veri ers|but, again, not a distributed system of always-running processes.
Entity authentication is not to be confused with message authentication or signing 23 ; here the goal is to authenticate a document rather than an entity, and the model is di erent. We will see, however, that message authentication is a useful tool for entity authentication.
Much discussed in the literature is the ma a fraud" or grandmaster chess problem", in which an adversary faithfully relays messages between communication partners; in some settings cf. 10 this constitutes a damaging attack. Protection against such attacks is addressed in 12 .
As we discussed, however, the faithful relaying of messages by an adversary does not, in our setting, constitute an attack; indeed, this is the basis of our de nition of mutual authentication.
Future directions
The communication model we h a v e i n troduced in this paper is captures attacks that are realistic threats in practice but not addressed by other models. It would make sense to return to known primitives, such as zero-knowledge proofs, and investigate their security in the more stringent setting we suggest.
Preliminaries
Notation. Let f0; 1g denote the set of nite binary strings, f0; 1g 1 the set of in nite ones, and f0; 1g L the set of binary strings of length at most L. The empty string is written . When a, b, c, : : :are strings used in some context, by a : b : c : w e denote an encoding of these strings such that each constituent string is e ciently recoverable given the encoding and the context of the string's receipt. In our protocols, concatenation will usually be adequate for this purpose. A function is e ciently computable if it can be computed in time polynomial in its rst argument. Explanation. I is a set of identities which de nes the players who can participate in the protocol. Although our protocols involve only two parties, the set of players I could be larger, to handle the possibility for example of an arbitrary pool of players who share a secret key. Elements of I will sometimes be denoted A or B Alice and Bob, rather than i; j; w e will switch back and forth irrationally between these notations. We stress that A; B and i; j are variables ranging over I not xed members of I, so A = B or i = j is quite possible. Note that the adversary is not a player in our formalization.
The value a that a player sees is the private information provided to him. This string is sometimes called the long-lived key or LL-key of a player. In the case of pure symmetric authentication, all players i 2 I will get the same LL-key, and the adversary will be denied this key. In general, a LL-key generator G associated to a protocol will determine who gets what initial LL-key see below.
The value " is supposed to suggest, for m, that the the player sends no message." For , it means that the player has not yet reached a decision." For , it means the player does not currently have a n y private output." The values A and R, for , are supposed to suggest accept" and reject," respectively. W e denote the t-th component of for t 2 f 1 ; 2 ; 3 g b y t .
Acceptance usually does not occur until the end of the protocol, although rejection may occur at any time. Some protocol problems, such a s m utual authentication, do not make use of the private output; these protocol are concerned only with acceptance or rejection. For others, including key exchange protocols, the private output of a party will be what this party thinks is the key which has been exchanged. It is convenient to assume that once a player has accepted or rejected, this output cannot change.
To each protocol is associated its number ofmoves, R. In general this is a polynomially bounded, polynomial time computable function of the security parameter; in all our protocols, however, it is a constant.
The LL-Key Generator. Associated to a protocol is a long-lived key generator LL-key generator G1 k ; ; r G . This is a polynomial time algorithm which takes as input a security parameter 1 k , the identity of a party 2 I f E g , and an in nite string r G 2 f 0 ; 1 g 1 coin ips of the generator.
For all of the protocols of this paper, the associated LL-key generator will be a symmetric one, where for each i; j 2 I we h a v e that G1 k ; i ; r G = G 1 k ; j ; r G ; while, on the other hand, G1 k ; E; r G = . The value of G1 k ; i ; r G will just be a pre x of r G that is, a random string. The length of this pre x will vary according to the protocol we consider.
The presence of the LL-key generator allows us to consider protocols which w e could not consider if we built a particular generator into our de nition. For example, we can consider symmetric protocols which require that there be public information known to all parties. In this manner, the formalization of a protocol does not need to change depending on the particular setting. Although we will not need this extra generality in this paper, it seems useful to present.
A Communication Model for Distributed Security
We will now formulate a model appropriate for de ning authentication and key distribution goals in the distributed environment. The situation we address is one where communication between players is entirely controlled by the adversary. The adversary can deliver messages out of order and to unintended recipients, and she can concoct messages of her own choosing. What is more, the adversary can conduct as many sessions as she pleases amongst the players, and she can control, for each, who is attempting to authenticate to whom.
Formally the adversary E is a probabilistic machine 3 E1 k ; a E ; r E equipped with an in nite collection of oracles s i;j , for i; j 2 I and s 2 N. Oracle s i;j models player i attempting to authenticate player j in session" s. Adversary E communicates with the oracles via queries of the form i; j; s; x written on a special tape. The query is intended to mean that E is sending message x to i, claiming it is from j in session s. The query will, in our model, be answered by s i;j ; the manner in which this response is computed is given by the following experiment."
Running The Protocol. Running a protocol with LL-key generator G in the presence of an adversary E, using security parameter k, means performing the following experiment:
1 Choose a random string r G 2 f 0 ; 1 g 1 and set a i = G1 k ; i ; r G , for i 2 I, and set a E = 1 k ; E; r G .
2 Choose a random string r E 2 f 0 ; 1 g 1 and, for each i; j 2 I, s 2 N, a random string r s i;j 2 f0; 1g 1 . 3 Let s i;j = for all i; j 2 I and u 2 N. The variable s i;j will keep track of the conversation that s i;j engages in.
4 Run adversary E on input 1 k ; a E ; r E , answering oracle calls as follows. When E asks a query i; j; s; x, oracle s i;j computes m; ; = 1 k ; i ; j ; a i ; s i;j : x ; r s i;j and answers with m; . Then s i;j gets replaced by s i;j : x . W e point out that in response to an oracle call, E learns not only the outgoing message but also whether or not the oracle has accepted or rejected. For convenience of discourse, we often omit mention of the latter. According to the above, E doesn't learn the oracle's private output. For some problems such as authenticated key exchange we will need to give the adversary the power to sometimes learn these private outputs. Such an extension is handled by specifying a new kind of oracle query and then indicating how the experiment is extended with responses to the new class of queries.
The Benign Adversary. It is useful for some of our de nitions to consider a certain particularly friendly kind of adversary. An adversary is called benign if it is deterministic and restricts its action to choosing a pair of oracles s i;j and t j;i and then faithfully conveying each o w from one oracle to the other, with s i;j beginning rst. In other words, the rst query E makes is i; j; s; , generating response 1 ; the second query E makes is j; i; t; 1 , generating response 1 ; and so forth. While the choice of i; j; s; t is up to the adversary, this choice is the same in all executions with security parameter k.
Time. In a particular execution of a protocol, the adversary's i-th query to an oracle is said to occur at time = i 2 R. W e i n tentionally do not specify f i g, except to demand that i j when i j . Conforming notions of time include abstract time," where i = i, and Turing machine time," where i = the i-th step in E's computation, when parties are realized by i n teracting Turing machines. Another conforming notion of time but a harder one to formalize is real time," where i the exact time when the i-th query is made, when parties are realized by i n teracting computers.
A Single Model For Many Goals. We h a v e not yet de ned any particular goal; we h a v e only speci ed the adversarial model in which these goals are formulated. Indeed, this same model underlies a large collection of authentication and key-distribution goals. In the following, we de ne mutual authentication and authenticated key exchange, but we stress that these de nitions can be easily extended to ones for related problems, including unilateral and three-party authentication.
Entity Authentication
A central notion in formalizing entity authentication goals is that of a matching conversation.
Matching Conversations
We will de ne mutual authentication MA by an experiment i n v olving the running of adversary E with security parameter k. When E terminates, each oracle s i;j has had a certain conversation s i;j with E, and it has reached a certain decision 2 f A, R, g. Whether or not is a secure MA protocol is de ned in terms of the distribution on these conversations and decisions. One way t o think of it is that each execution will be classi ed as either good" or bad," depending on whether or not the adversary managed to subvert this particular run. We n o w turn towards distinguishing the good runs from the bad. We n o w de ne matching conversations. For simplicity w e focus on the case where R is odd; the case of even R is analogous and is left to the reader. Explanations follow the formal de nition. Explanation. Case 1 de nes when the conversation of a responder oracle matches the conversation of an initiator oracle. Case 2 de nes when the conversation of an initiator oracle matches the conversation of a responder oracle. Let us paraphrase our de nition. Consider an execution in which s A;B is an initiator oracle and t B;A is a responder oracle. If every message that s A;B sends out, except possibly the last, is subsequently delivered to t B;A , with the response to this message being returned to s A;B as its own next message, then we s a y that the conversation of t B;A matches that of s A;B . Similarly, i f every message that t B;A receives was previously generated by s A;B , and each message that t B;A sends out is subsequently delivered to s A;B , with the response that this message generates being returned to t B;A as its own next message, then we s a y that the conversation of s A;B matches the one of t B;A . Note that this second condition is easily seen to imply the rst one.
We comment that the party who sends the last ow s A;B , a b o v e can't know" whether or not its last message was received by its partner, so when this oracle accepts accepts, it cannot know" assuming this last message to be relevant whether or not its partner will accept. This asymmetry is an inherent aspect of authentication protocols with a xed number of moves, giving a certain information bene t to the party who refrains from putting in the last word.
We will say that oracle t j;i has a matching conversation with oracle s i;j if the rst has conversation K 0 , the second has conversation K, and K 0 matches K. Either party, here, may be the initiator.
Mutual Authentication
We n o w de ne mutual authentication, provide a simple protocol for it, and, assuming the existence of pseudo-random function, prove this protocol meets our de nition.
Definition. We require that any m utual authentication protocol have R 3 rounds. We implicitly make this assumption in our de nition and throughout the remainder of this paper.
In a mutual authentication protocol, when a party accepts with a certain conversation K, that party believes that there is some other party who engaged in a matching conversation K 0 . Just saying this wouldn't be enough: we also need that parties accept in the absence of an adversary.
Let No-Matching E k be the event that there exist i; j; s such that s i;j accepted and there is no oracle t j;i which engaged in a matching conversation. The de nition of a mutual authentication is as follows:
De nition 4.2 secure mutual authentication We say that is a secure mutual authentication protocol if for any polynomial time adversary E, 1 Matching conversations acceptance. If oracles s A;B and t B;A have matching conversations, then both oracles accept.
2 Acceptance matching conversations. The probability of No-Matching E k is negligible.
Restating this may make it clearer. The rst condition says that if each party's messages are faithfully relayed to one another, than the parties accept the authentication of one another. The second condition calls an execution good if for each accepting conversation K by an oracle s i;j there exists a matching conversation K 0 by some oracle t j;i , and bad otherwise. We require that the probability of a bad execution be negligible.
Uniqueness Of Matching Partner. One consequence of the de nition worth stating is that an oracle's matching partner is unique. More formally, let Multiple-Match E k be the event that some s i;j accepts, and there are at least two distinct oracles t j;i and t 0 j;i which h a v e had matching conversations with s i;j . W e can show the following. Then the probability of Multiple-Match E k is negligible.
The proof is given in Appendix C. We comment that in all of our protocols the probability o f Multiple-Match E k is not just negligible but exponentially small, being at most T E k 2 2 ,k where T E k is the polynomial number of oracle calls of the adversary.
Authenticating Messages. Message authentication via pseudo-random functions 18, 19 is a tool in our entity authentication protocols. Let f be a pseudorandom function family 18 . Denote by f a : f0; 1g Lk ! f 0 ; 1 g l k the function speci ed by k ey a. In general, the length of the key, the length L of the input to f a , and the length l of the output, are all functions of the security parameter. Here we assume the key length is just k, and, for our rst protocol MAP1 it su ces to assume Lk = 4 k and lk = k .
F or any string x 2 f 0 ; 1 g L k de ne x a = x; f a x; this will serve as an authentication of message x 18, 1 9 . For any i 2 I, i : x a will serve a s i 's authentication of message x.
A P r otocol For Mutual Authentication. Our rst protocol called MAP1," for mutual authentication protocol one" is represented by Figure 2 . Alice A begins by sending Bob B a random challenge R A of length k. Bob responds by making up a random challenge R B of length k and returning B : A : R A : R B a . Alice checks that this message is of the right form and is correctly tagged as coming from B. If it is, Alice sends Bob the message A : R B a and accepts. Bob checks that this message is of the right form and is correctly tagged as coming from A, and, if it is, he accepts. We stress that checking the message is of the right form, for A in the second ow, includes checking that the nonce present in the message is indeed the same nonce she sent in the rst ow; similarly for B with respect to checking the third ow. We comment that A = B is permitted; these are any t w o identities in the set I. arbitrary nonces. A nonce i s a v alue used at most once. The challenges must be unpredictable; a predictable nonce like a sequence number won't work.
Out-Of-Band Data. Notice that A is not present in the rst ow, even though, in practice," B may need this information to select the right" shared key a. F ormally, this identi er is irrelevant; in practice, it might be communicated out of band," or it might be authenticated along with the other exchanged messages, as we n o w describe.
Authenticated Exchange Of Text. For most applications, it is useful to combine a mutual authentication with an exchange of authenticated data, so that an accepting party accepts not only the identity of a partner, but also has con dence that data associated to protocol ows originates with this partner. A protocol to accomplish this, derived from MAP1, is shown in Figure 3 . Here the Text i strings are authenticated along with the rest of the exchanged messages. As illustrated in the next section, one use of these strings is to carry an encryption of a fresh session key, thereby accomplishing an authenticated key exchange.
We will not, in this paper, give a n y formal de nition of the authenticated exchange of text goal. We give the MAP2 only to serve a s i n tuition for the derivation of the AKEP1. However the de nitions of authenticated key exchange and formal proof of correctness of AKEP1 that we will provide later will be independent of discussions of authenticated exchange of text.
Security Of 2PP. Combining ideas from our proof of Theorem 4.4 with a lemma from 2 , we can show that a special case of the protocol 2PP of 6 meets our de nition of a secure mutual authentication. Speci cally, assume that the encryption" function E being used in 2PP is a PRF; assume nonces are instantiated with random values; and assume jIj = 2 and authenticating parties are guaranteed to have distinct identities. The CBC Lemma of 2 stated here informally as Lemma D.1 s a ys that the function being used in their protocol, namely the CBC of E, will also be a PRF. Given this, one can trace through our proof as given in Appendix A and check that it extends.
Discussion. Our de nition is very strong|perhaps the strongest possible natural de nition. In asking that ows match exactly it may be criticized as too strong; as pointed out by 11 , certain parts of protocol ows might be irrelevant" for the authentication, and perhaps one ought to allow them to be ignored in matching. Such extensions seem valuable, especially for the asymmetric case. The case where all protocol ows except authenticated text strings, if present are ignored may be particularly interesting.
Authenticated Key Exchange
We specify a formal de nition for authenticated key exchange AKE. As mentioned in the introduction, mutual authentication protocols can usually be extended to distribute keys. We will appropriately extend MAP1 to AKEP1 and prove that it meets our de nition. We will also specify AKEP2, the implicit" key distribution protocol associated to MAP1; this protocol manages to distribute a key with no added communication overhead.
Session Keys. We wish to say what it means for a MA protocol to be a secure AKE. Fix S = fS k g k2N with each S k a distribution over f0; 1g k , for some polynomial k. The intent o f an AKE will be both to authenticate entities and to distribute a session key" sampled from S k .
When a player accepts, his private output will be interpreted as the session key which he has computed. Formally, the session key will be de ned by 3 . F or simplicity, w e assume that an accepting player always has a string-valued private output of the right length that is, if 2 = A then 3 2 f 0 ; 1 g k , while a non-accepting player has a session key of that is, if 2 2 f R ; g then 3 = .
Session Key Freshness. An important property that we w ant of a protocol that distributes session keys is that the compromise of one of these keys should have minimal consequences overall. For example, its revelation should not allow one to subvert subsequent authentication, nor should it leak information about other as yet uncompromised session keys. To capture this requirement, we extend the interaction of the adversary with its oracles by adding a new type of query, as follows: we s a y that the adversary can learn a session key s i;j of an oracle s i;j by issuing to the oracle a distinguished reveal query, which takes the form i; j; s; reveal. The answer returned by the oracle is s i;j .
To quantify the power of an adversary who can perform this new type of query, w e require some additional de nitions. Initially, each oracle s i;j is declared unopened, and so it remains until the adversary generates a reveal query i; j; s; reveal. At this point, the oracle is declared opened. We s a y that an oracle s i;j is fresh if the following three conditions hold: First, s i;j has accepted. Second, s i;j is unopened. Third, there is no opened oracle t j;i which engaged in a matching conversation with s i;j . When oracle s i;j is fresh, we will also say that the oracle holds a fresh session key." Intuitively, an oracle holds a fresh session key if that key is unavailable to the adversary by trivial means.
Protecting Fresh Session Keys. We w ant that the adversary should be unable to understand anything interesting about a fresh session key. This can be formalized along the lines of security o f probabilistic encryption; the particular formalization we will adapt is that of polynomial indistinguishability of encryptions 21, 1 6 , 1 7 . We demand that at the end of a secure AKE the adversary should be unable to distinguish a fresh session key from a random element o f S k . W e proceed as follows.
After the adversary has asked all the i; j; s; x and i; j; s; reveal queries that she wishes to ask, the adversary asks of a fresh oracle s i;j a single query i; j; s; test. The query is answered by ipping a fair coin b f 0 ; 1 g and returning s i;j if b = 0, or else a random sample from S k if b = 1. The adversary's job is to guess b. T o this end, she outputs a bit Guess, and then terminates. Let Good-Guess E k be the event that Guess parameter k; in other words, this is the probability the adversary has correctly identi ed whether she was given the real session key or just a sample from S k . Let
Secure AKE. We are now ready to give the main de nition of this section. We refer the reader to Section 3 for the de nition of a benign adversary.
De nition 5.1 Authenticated Key Exchange AKE Protocol is a secure AKE over S = fS k g k2N if is a secure mutual authentication protocol, and, in addition, the following are true:
1 Benign adversary keys according to S k Let B be any benign adversary and let s i;j and t j;i be its chosen oracles in the experiment with security parameter k. Then both oracles always accept, s i;j = t j;i , and moreover this random variable is distributed a c c ording to S k .
2 Session key is protected Let E be any polynomial time adversary. Then advantage E k is negligible.
The rst condition says that if ows are honestly conveyed then a session key is agreed upon, and this key is properly distributed. The second condition says that the adversary can't tell this session key from a random string of the same distribution.
Comments. Since the protocol is assumed to be a secure mutual authentication, we know that if oracles s i;j and t j;i have matching conversations then they both accept. From the rst condition it follows that they will also have the same session key. It is now easier to see why it is only fair to talk about the adversary guessing session key random key for an oracle hiding a fresh session key. If the oracle pointed to by E is not fresh then E already knows the key: If the oracle has not accepted then the key is and E sees whether or not an oracle has accepted; if the oracle has been opened, then the adversary was provided the session key; and if a matching partner has had its oracle opened, then once again E knows the session key, a s E can tell that this oracle engaged in a matching conversation. Of course our assumption that E always points to a fresh oracle is just a convenient simpli cation, in the sense that we cannot stop an arbitrary adversary from pointing to an unfresh oracle and there may w ell be no fresh oracle to point to at all. But this is clearly not a situation which there is any need to address.
Protocol. Let S = fS k g be a family of samplable distributions on f0; 1g k . A protocol for AKE over distribution S is derived from MAP2 by using the second text string to communicate an encrypted key, as follows.
The parties share a 2k bit LL-key which w e denote a 1 ; a 2 . The rst part, a 1 , is taken as the key to the pseudo-random function family f, yielding a PRF f a 1 : f0; 1g Lk ! f 0 ; 1 g k to be used for message authentication; this time, Lk = 5 k + k will su ce. The second part, a 2 , is used a s a k ey to another pseudo-random family f 0 with the property that f 0 a 2 : f0; 1g k ! f 0 ; 1 g k . A probabilistic encryption of string 2 f 0 ; 1 g k is de ned by f g a 2 def = r ; f 0 a 2 r , with r selected at random 18 . Party B chooses the session key from S k and sets Text 2 to be f g a 2 . The strings Text 1 and Text 3 of MAP2 are set to . This protocol, which w e call AKEP1, is shown in Figure 4 .
It is important that a 2 the key used for encryption be distinct from a 1 the shared key used for the message authentication. Formally, the LL-key generator G provides the parties i 2 I with a 2 k -bit shared key. The two k eys need not be independent, however; the generator could set a i = f a i i = 1 ; 2 where a is a random k bit key and f a is a pseudo-random function.
Theorem 5.2 Let S = fS k g be samplable, and suppose f;f 0 are pseudo-random function families with the parameters speci ed a b ove. Then the protocol AKEP1 based o n f;f 0 i s a s e cure AKE over S.
The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix B.
Implicit Key Distribution. A more e cient in terms of communication complexity AKE protocol may be devised by using what we call an implicit" key distribution. In this case, the ows between A and B are the same as in MAP1, and one or more of the parameters already present in the ows of MAP1 say R B is used to de ne the session key. Speci cally, let S = fS k g be a family of distributions given by S k = gU k , for some deterministic, polynomial-time computable function g, where U k is the uniform distribution on k-bit strings; for example S k = U k and g the identity, the most useful choice in practice. Again the parties share a 2k bit LL-key a 1 ; a 2 , with a 1 being used as the key in MAP1 so Lk = 4 k . Let f 0 be a pseudorandom permutation family 28 ; f 0 a 2 speci es a permutation on f0; 1g k . De ne the protocol AKEP2 by h a ving its ows be identical to MAP1, with a 1 being used for message authentication. Each accepting party outputs session key = gf 0 a 2 R B . This protocol, which w e call AKEP2, is shown in Figure 5 . Modifying the proof of Theorem 5.2 we can show the following: Theorem 5.3 Let S = fS k g be given by S k = gU k , for some polynomial time g. Suppose f;f 0 are a pseudo-random function family and a pseudo-random permutation family, with the parameters speci ed a b ove. Then the protocol AKEP2 based o n f;f 0 is a secure AKE over S.
The assumption that f 0 is a pseudo-random permutation can be relaxed to f 0 being a pseudo-random function at the cost of distribution on session keys being S k = gV k , where V k is pseudo-randomly distributed.
Discussion. A potential concern about the de nition is whether or not hiding information about individual session keys is good enough. For example, is it possible that an adversary for a secure AKE might be able to point t o a p air of fresh oracles, holding keys and , and then be able to The formalization of the adversary's being unable to learn anything about a fresh session key could also have been made by adapting the notion of semantic security" of encryptions 21, 1 6 , 1 7 to our setting. Roughly, w e w ould say the following. Let E be any polynomial time adversary and let Q k be any collection of functions indexed by the security parameter k and possible views of the adversary. Then there exists an adversary E 0 such that the following is true. If E could correctly predict Q k on a fresh session key with probability pk then E 0 could predict Q k on a random, hidden sample of S k with probability negligibly di erent from pk. Properly formalized, this can be shown to be equivalent to the second condition in De nition 5.1.
Our de nition has been designed to ensure the following: after the key distribution protocol, it should be possible to use the session key for any purpose for which an out-of band distributed key could have been used. That is, the session key distributed by an AKE protocol may be used as safely as one handed privately to each party b y a trusted third party.
One consequence of the strength of our de nition is to exclude some protocols which seem to have traditionally been considered secure." For example, let AKEP1 0 work just like AKEP1 except that, in the third move, the message authentication is computed under the newly distributed session key , instead of under the long-lived key a 1 . One can check that this protocol is not a secure AKE under our de nition. To see, intuitively, that our de nition is right to exclude it, note that it is possible to construct a protocol that is secure if had been distributed out-of-band but not if is distributed by AKEP1 0 .
Nonetheless weaker notions for protecting the security of a distributed key may be desirable in some settings. For example, in some situations the intended usage of the session key is speci c and known, and a de nition could be designed which ensured that the distributed session key was secure enough to su ce for the particular intended application although it may not su ce for other applications. We believe such i n v estigations would be useful and constitute interesting open questions.
From Theory to Practice
The provably secure protocols of the previous sections lead to e cient and secure-in-practice protocols when the pseudorandom functions in terms of which these protocols are described are correctly and e ciently instantiated. The purpose of this section is to illustrate some options for doing this. We then move on to discuss some further implementation speci cs.
Constructions of Practical Pseudo-Random Functions
We will suggest constructions of PRFs suitable for our purposes based on DES and secure hash functions such as MD5. Let's begin by discussing the primitives.
Primitives. The algorithm of the DES speci es for each 64 bit key a a permutation DES a from f0; 1g 64 to f0; 1g 64 . The viewpoint adopted here |suggested by Luby and Racko 28, 29 | is to regard DES as a pseudo-random permutation, with respect to practical computation.
The MD5 function 32 maps an arbitrary string x into a 128-bit string MD5x. It is intended that this function be a collision-free hash function, with respect to practical computation.
The Problem And Our Design Philosophy. Cryptographic practice provides good PRFs on particular input lengths l for example, DES for l = 64. In contrast, our protocols need PRFs for arbitrary input lengths. In devising such PRFs, we prefer not to rely purely on heuristics. In most cases we will rely on provably correct constructions of arbitrary length PRFs based on xed length PRFs and collision free hash functions, individually or in combination; the lemmas underlying our constructions are summarized in Appendix D. The exception is the third construction given below; we'll discuss it when we get there.
Notation. Let g a denote a PRF of l bits to l bits. Suppose y has length a multiple of l bits, and write it as a sequence of l bit blocks, y = y 1 : : : y n . The cipher block c haining CBC operator de nes CBC g a y 1 : : : y n = g a y 1 if n = 1 g a CBC g a y 1 : : : y n , 1 y n otherwise Let H denote a collision free hash function of f0; 1g to f0; 1g 2l . Let H 1 x and H 2 x denote the rst l bits of Hx and the last l bits of Hx, respectively. Finally hxi l will denote some standard padding of x to string of length a multiple of l bits; for example, always add a 1 and then add enough zeroes to get to a length which i s a m ultiple of l.
Constructions. We suggest three constructions of a PRF f a mapping long inputs to short outputs. For each construction we discuss its security and e ciency. Here l = 64, H = MD5, g = DES. The key a has length 64 bits.
1 The CBC PRF. Let f a x be the rst l=2 bits of CBC g a hxi l : jhxi l j, where jyj is the length of y encoded as an l-bit string. This construction is justi ed by Lemma D.1. Lemma D.1 does not require us to drop the last l=2 bits of the output. We drop them for two reasons. The rst is e ciency. The second is speci c to DES and will not be discussed here.
2 The CBC Hash PRF. Let f a x be the rst l=2 bits of g a g a H 1 xH 2 x = CBC g a Hx.
This construction is justi ed by Corollary D.3. In software this is signi cantly more e cient than the CBC construction, requiring one hash and two DES operations.
3 The Pure Hash PRF. Let f a x be the rst l=2 bits of Hx : a . This construction was suggested in 36 as a message authentication code; we suggest the stronger assumption that it is a PRF. However no standard assumption about H of which w e are aware can be used to justify the the security of this construction, and it should be viewed more as a heuristic than the two constructions suggested above.
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In software, however, it is the most e cient of the three constructions. All the above constructions are practical. However, since the security of the last construction is not as well justi ed as the rst two, our overall preference is to use the CBC-Hash PRF for software applications and the CBC PRF for hardware applications.
Similar constructions can be given using other primitives; for example the SHA instead of MD5, etc.
We stress the importance, in our security considerations, of the CBC and Hash Lemmas of Appendix D; the lack of such lemmas has lead in the past to more complex assumptions about the security of CBC and other constructions e.g., 6, De nition 2.1 .
E ciency and Implementation Issues in our Protocols
We suggest that the random challenges be 64 bits. We suggest each identity be encoded with 64 bits. Remember that identities only need be unique among the space of parties that share the secret key. Even for the key exchange protocols, the parties only need share a 64-bit LL-key a; two 64-bit keys a 1 and a 2 can be derived from a by setting a 1 = g a 1 and a 2 = g a 2, for a PRF g. This method to create multiple e ective k eys from a single LL-key preserves all claims of provable security. The PRFs used for message authentication and message encryption can be constructed using any of the methods of the last subsection.
In implementation, redundant parts of the ows may be dropped. For example, the second ow of MAP1 speci ed in Figure 2 Such optimizations may be made in other protocol ows. Such optimizations do not damage claims of provable security.
When jIj = 2 and authenticating parties are guaranteed to have distinct identities, the identity A in the second ow of MAP1 and derivative protocols may be dropped. This optimization does not damage claims of provable security. Protocol AKEP2 provides a particularly e cient k ey exchange. The computational complexity is minimally more than that of MAP1, and the communication complexity is identical. A useful instantiation in this regard is to use f 0 = DES, exploiting the fact that DES is a permutation to get a uniformly distributed session key. We prove that MAP1 is a secure mutual authentication protocol under the assumption that f is a PRF. The rst condition of De nition 4.2 is easily veri ed; it merely says that when the messages between A and B are faithfully relayed to one another, each party accepts. We n o w prove that the second condition holds.
Fix an adversary E. Recall that the domain of our PRF is f0; 1g Lk and its range is f0; 1g k . I n the following, will denote MAP1. In what follows we will be considering a variety of experiments involving the running of E with its oracles. In order to avoid confusion, we will refer to the experiment of running E with MAP1 the experiment about which w e wish to prove our theorem as the real" experiment.
MAP1 With A g Oracle. Let g be a function of f0; 1g Lk to f0; 1g k . Let x g = x; gx. MAP1 g denotes the protocol in which, instead of a shared secret a, the parties share an oracle for g, and they compute x g wherever MAP1 asks them to compute x a . W e de ne the experiment of running E for MAP1 g to be the same as the experiment of running E for MAP1 except for the following di erence. There is no shared secret a; instead, the oracles s i;j all have access to a common g oracle and compute their ows according to MAP1 g . Note E is not given access to the g oracle. When g = f a for randomly chosen a, this experiment coincides with the real experiment. Of interest in our proof is the case of g being a truly random function; we call this the random MAP1 experiment.
The Random MAP1 Experiment. In the random MAP1 experiment w e select g as a random function of f0; 1g Lk to f0; 1g k , and then run the experiment of running E with MAP1 g . Recall that No-Matching E k denotes the event that there exists an oracle s i;j who accepts although no oracle t j;i engaged in a matching conversation; we will refer to it also as the event that the adversary is successful. Recall that an initiator oracle is one who sends a rst ow that is, it plays the role of A in Figure 2 while a responder oracle is one who plays the opposite role namely that of B in the same Figure. Let T E k denote a polynomial bound on the number of oracle calls made by E, and assume wlog that this is at least two.
Lemma A.1 The probability that the adversary E is successful in the random MAP1 experiment is at most T E k 2 2 ,k .
Proof: We split the examination of acceptance into two cases.
Claim 1: Fix A; B; s. The probability that s A;B accepts without a matching conversation, given that it is an initiator oracle, is at most T E k 2 ,k . Proof. Suppose at time 0 oracle s A;B sent the ow R A . Let R 0 = f R 0 A 2 f 0 ; 1 g k : 9 ;tsuch that t B;A was given R 0 A as rst ow at a time 0 . g : If s A;B is to accept, then at some time 2 0 it must receive B : A : R A : R B g for some R B . I f no oracle previously output this ow, the probability that the adversary can compute it correctly is at most 2 ,k . So consider the case where some oracle did output this ow. The form of the ow implies that the oracle which output it must be a t B;A oracle which received R A as its own rst ow. The probability of this event happening before time 0 is bounded by the probability that R A 2 R 0 , and this probability is at most T E k , 1 2 ,k . If it happened after time 0 then we w ould have a matching conversation. We conclude that the probability that s A;B accepts but there is no matching conversation is at most T E k 2 ,k . 2 Claim 2: Fix B; A; t. The probability that t B;A accepts without a matching conversation, given that it is a responder oracle, is at most T E k 2 ,k . Proof. Suppose at time 1 oracle t B;A received the ow R A and responded with B : A : R A : R B g . If t B;A is to accept, then at some time 3 1 it must receive A : R B g . If no oracle previously output this ow, the probability that the adversary can compute it correctly is at most 2 ,k . W e m ust now consider the case where some oracle did output this ow. The form of the ow implies that the oracle which output it must be a s A;C oracle.
The interaction of a s A;C oracle with E has in general the form 0 ; ; R 0 A ; 2 ; C : A : R 0 A : R 0 B g ; A : R 0 B g for some 0 2 . F or any such i n teraction, except with probability 2 , k , there is a u C;A oracle which output C : A : R 0 A : R 0 B g at some time. If u; C 6 = t; B then the probability that R 0 B = R B is at most T E k,2 2 ,k , and thus the probability that the ow A : R 0 B g leads t B;A to accept is at most T E k,2 2 ,k . On the other hand suppose u; C = t; B. It follows that 0 1 2 3 , R 0 A = R A and R 0 B = R B ; that is, the conversations match. We conclude that the probability that t B;A accepts but there is no matching conversation is at most T E k 2 ,k . 2
The probability that there exists an oracle which accepts without a matching conversation is at most T E k times the bound obtained in the claims, which i s T E k 2 2 , k as desired.
The Proof Concluded. To conclude the proof, we argue by contradiction. Suppose that the probability that adversary E is successful in the real experiment is not negligible. Then there is an in nite set K and a constant c such that for all k 2 K the probability o f No-Matchingk in the real experiment is at least k ,c . We will now construct a polynomial time test T which distinguishes random functions from pseudo-random functions. T receives as an oracle a function g: f0; 1g Lk ! f 0 ; 1 g k which i s c hosen according to the following experiment: ip a coin C, and if C = 1 let g be a random function, else pick a at random and let g = f a . T's job is to predict C with some advantage. T's strategy is to run the experiment of running E for MAP1 g . In this experiment, T itself simulates all oracles s i;j , answering E by running the protocol MAP1 g in the manner of these oracles. If E is successful note that T can tell whether or not E succeeded then T predicts 0 g is pseudo-random else T predicts 1 g is random. Lemma A.1 and our assumption about the success of E when g = f a the real experiment imply that T has advantage k ,d , for some d 0 and all k 2 K, contradicting the pseudo-randomness of f.
B Proof of Theorem 5.2
We prove that AKEP1 is a secure authenticated key exchange protocol under the assumption that f;f 0 are PRFs.
The proof that AKEP1 is a secure mutual authentication protocol is analogous to the proof of Theorem 4.4 given in Appendix A and is omitted. Condition 1 of De nition 5.1 is easily veri ed: the session key is chosen in AKEP1 according to S k and so in the presence of a benign adversary the oracles certainly accept, and with this same key. W e concentrate on the proof that condition 2 of De nition 5.1 is satis ed.
Fix an adversary E. Recall that we are using two PRFs: f a 1 : f0; 1g Lk ! f 0 ; 1 g k and f 0 a 2 : f0; 1g k ! f 0 ; 1 g k . The rst is for the authentication and the second is to encrypt the session key. In what follows will denote AKEP1, and the real" experiment will denote the experiment of running E for AKEP1.
AKEP1 With A g 0 Oracle. Let g 0 be a function mapping : f0; 1g k to f0; 1g k . Let E g 0 ; r = r ; g 0 r . Let f g g 0 be the random variable resulting from picking r 2 f 0 ; 1 g k at random and outputting E g 0 ; r. AKEP1 g 0 denotes the protocol in which the parties share a secret a 1 and an oracle for g 0 . Whenever AKEP1 asks them to compute f g a 2 they compute f g g 0 . The experiment of running E for AKEP1 g 0 is the same as the experiment of running E for AKEP1 except that the second part of the shared key, namely a 2 , is absent, and instead the oracles s i;j all have access to a common g 0 oracle and compute their ows according to AKEP1 g 0 . E does not have access to g 0 . When g 0 = f 0 a 2 for randomly chosen a 2 , this experiment coincides with the real experiment. The Random AKEP1 Experiment. In the random AKEP1 experiment w e select g 0 as a random function of f0; 1g k to f0; 1g k , and then run the experiment of running E with AKEP1 g 0 . A s before, let T E k denote a polynomial bound on the number of oracle calls made by E.
Lemma B.1 In the random AKEP1 experiment, advantage E k is negligible. Proof: Let c 0 be a constant. We will show that advantage E k k ,c for all su ciently large k.
A view of E consists of all the oracle queries made by E, the responses to them, and E's own coin tosses; that is precisely what E sees. We denote by viewk the random variable whose value is the view of the interaction of E with its oracles. A particular view will usually be denoted . We will be interested in two properties may possess. If for any accepting oracle there exists an oracle with a matching conversation then we s a y is authentic. I f r 1 ; y 1 ; : : : ; r n ; y n denote the encryptions output by oracles in the transcript and r 1 ; : : : ; r n are distinct then we s a y is noncolliding. Recall that b denotes the bit ipped in our answer to a test query in the de nition of measuring advantage E k. Now x a particular authentic and non-colliding view . Suppose E is pointing to fresh oracle s A;B . Since s A;B has accepted and is authentic, there is an oracle t B;A which engaged in a matching conversation. This means the encryption for this conversation was selected by one of the oracles speci cally, the one who played the role of the responder. The oracle's being fresh means that any matching partner is unopened. Since is non-colliding it follows that conditioned on viewk = , the key s A;B is uniformly distributed over S k , and E's advantage in predicting the bit b is 0. Let N k denote the set of non-authentic views and C k the set of colliding views. We claim that AKEP1 g 0 , with g 0 chosen at random, still remains a secure mutual authentication; the proof of this is analogous to the proof of Theorem 4.4 and hence is omitted. Based on this claim, we know that the probability o f N k is at most k ,c =2 for large enough k. On the other hand the probability o f C k is at most T E k 2 2 ,k which is at most k ,c =2 for large enough k. Combined with the above w e conclude that E's advantage is at most k ,c .
The Proof Concluded. We argue by contradiction. Suppose that the probability that advantage E k is not negligible in the real experiment. Then there is an in nite set K and a constant c such that for all k 2 K the advantage of E in the real experiment is at least k ,c . W e will now construct a polynomial time test T which distinguishes random functions from pseudorandom functions. T receives as an oracle a function g 0 : f0; 1g k ! f 0 ; 1 g k which i s c hosen according to the following experiment: ip a coin C, and if C = 1 let g 0 be a random function, else pick a 2 at random and let g 0 = f 0 a 2 . T's job is to predict C with some advantage. T's strategy is to run the experiment of running E for AKEP1 g 0 . In this experiment, T itself simulates all oracles s i;j , answering E by running the protocol AKEP1 g 0 in the manner of these oracles. In this process T will itself select all the session keys for the oracles. T can answer the reveal queries for oracles of which it selected they key; the probability that T must answer a reveal query for an oracle whose key T didn't select is negligible. Finally E outputs i; j; s; test. If T had not herself chosen s i;j in the execution then T outputs 0; this happens with negligible probability. Else T now ips a fair coin b. I f b = 0 she returns s i;j , else she returns a random sample from S k . N o w E outputs b 0 = Guess E k. T outputs 0 g 0 is pseudo-random if b 0 = b a n d 1 g 0 is random otherwise. Lemma B.1 and our assumption about the advantage of E when g 0 = f 0 a 2 the real experiment imply that T has advantage k ,d , for some d 0 and all k 2 K, contradicting the pseudo-randomness of f 0 .
C Proof of Proposition 4.3
The proof is by contradiction. Let E be a polynomial time adversary such that the probability o f Multiple-Match E k is not negligible. We will show that is not a secure MA protocol. In what follows Multiple-Match E 1 k denotes the event that a responder oracle t j;i accepts and there exist distinct initiator oracles s i;j ; s 0 i;j which h a v e had a matching conversation with t j;i . Multiple-Match E 2 k denotes the event that an initiator oracle s i;j accepts and there exist distinct responder oracles t j;i ; t 0 j;i which h a v e had a matching conversation with s i;j . W e split the proof into two cases.
Claim C.1 Suppose the probability of Multiple-Match E 1 k is not negligible. Then is not a secure MA protocol.
Proof: We begin with the following observation. If responder oracle t j;i accepts and distinct initiator oracles s i;j ; s 0 i;j have had matching conversations with t j;i , then the rst ow output by the oracles s i;j ; s 0 i;j is the same. Thus our assumption implies that there is an in nite set K and a constant c such that for all k 2 K the following is true: there exist i; j 2 I such that if initiator oracles 1 i;j ; 2 i;j are asked queries i; j; 1; and i; j; 2; respectively, then the probability that the responses are the same is at least k ,c . Based on this observation, we construct an adversary E 0 such that for all k 2 K the probability o f No-Matching E 0 k is at least k ,c =jIj can check that oracles 2 i;j and 1 j;i accept while no other oracles do. However, they have not had matching conversations. The reason is that the query i; j; 2; w as made at time 2 , but the string 1 1 used as the next ow t o 2 i;j was obtained albeit from 1 j;i a t a n e arlier time 1 2 . Of course the reason it could serve as response is that 1 1 = 2 1 . Our conclusion now follows from the fact that the probability that i;j a t a n e arlier time 1 2 . Of course the reason it could serve as response is that 1 1 = 2 1 . Our conclusion now follows from the fact that the probability that We note that this proof exploited the fact that the number of moves in a mutual authentication protocol is at least 3.
D Two Lemmas for Pseudo-Random Function Construction
We summarize here the lemmas justifying the constructions of PRFs given in Section 6. These lemmas are from 2 .
We recall the problem. We are given a PRF g a of l-bits to l-bits. We w ant a PRF which takes longer inputs to l-bit outputs. In what follows m will denote an upper bound on the desired input length. Formally l = lk and m = mk are both polynomially bounded functions of the security parameter k, and the PRFs are members of parameterized families of functions etc. Discussions here, however, will be informal. We will state things in terms of speci c functions and omit mention of k; the formal statements of the lemmas are easily reconstructed. We refer the reader to Section 6 for the de nition of CBC g a and hxi l .
Lemma D.1 CBC Lemma, 2 Suppose g a : f0; 1g l ! f 0 ; 1 g l is a PRF. Then, for any polynomially bounded m, f a x = CBC g a hxi l is a PRF from f0; 1g m to f0; 1g l . Also, f a x = CBC g a hxi l : jhxi l j is a PRF from f0; 1g m to f0; 1g l .
Although cipher block c haining is used in many places, Lemma D.1 provides the rst justi cation of its use as a PRF or MAC which depends only on the security of the underlying function.
A hash function H speci es for each k a map H k : f0; 1g ! f 0 ; 1 g h k . A collision seeking algorithm is a polynomial time algorithm which on input 1 k outputs a pair of distinct strings x; y 2 f 0 ; 1 g ; w e s a y the algorithm is successful if H k x = H k y . We s a y that H is collision free if every collision seeking algorithm has negligible success probability. In what follows we will as usual shove the asymptotics under the rug and regard a collision free hash function as H: f0; 1g ! f 0 ; 1 g h . Under the assumption that g a is a PRF and H is collision free, the CBC Hash PRF is provably secure. The following lemma is the rst step.
Lemma D.2 Hash Lemma, 2 Suppose H: f0; 1g ! f 0 ; 1 g h i s a c ollision free hash function and g a : f0; 1g h ! f 0 ; 1 g l is a PRF. Then f a : f0; 1g m ! f 0 ; 1 g l de ned b y f a x = g a H x is a PRF.
Since l = 64 DES and h = 128 MD5 in our applications, the following simple corollary of the above lemmas is worth stating. For completeness we give the simple proof. Assuming h = 2 l , let H 1 x; H 2 x denote the rst l bits and the last l bits of Hx, respectively. 
